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Abstract
Firms often undertake activities that do not necessarily increase cash ows (e.g., costly
investments in corporate social responsibility, or CSR), and some investors value these non-
cash activities (i.e., they have a tastefor these activities). We develop a model to capture
this phenomenon and focus on the asset-pricing implications of di¤erences in investorstastes
for rms activities and outputs. Our model shows that, rst, investor taste di¤erences
provide a basis for investor clientele e¤ects that are endogenously determined by the shares
demanded by di¤erent types of investors. Second, because the market must clear at one price,
investorsdemands are inuenced by all dimensions of rm output even if their preferences
are only over some dimensions. Third, information releases cause trading volume, even
when all investors have the same information. Fourth, investor taste provides a rationale for
corporate spin-o¤s that help rms better target their shareholder bases. Finally, individual
social responsibility can lead to corporate social responsibility when managers care about
stock price because price reacts to investments in CSR activities.
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1 Introduction
The discounted cash ow (DCF) framework provides the foundation for traditional asset pric-
ing theories and suggests that a manager can maximize the rms stock price by maximizing
the net present value of its cash ows. In other words, the amount, timing, and risk of cash
ows are the main factors to consider, while the process with which cash ows are generated
is not important in and of itself. However, rmsproduction processes inevitably generate
externalities. Broadly dened, production externalities include environmental e¤ects, em-
ployee treatment, corporate social responsibility (CSR), and positive or negative publicity
about the rm.1 While investors should value a dollar of cash ows today similarly, the
externalities generated by rmsinvestments might be valued highly by some investors and
valued little (or even ignored) by others. We use a parsimonious model in which investors
di¤er in how they value rmsproduction externalities to investigate the e¤ects of investor
taste on asset prices, and how taste can change how corporate disclosures and real decisions
a¤ect asset prices. To x ideas, we focus on CSR as a motivating example and discuss
alternative interpretations of the model below.
Investor preferences for CSR are becoming increasingly important to the allocation of re-
sources.2 Trillions of dollars are invested in socially responsible funds that tilt their portfolios
in favor of rms that act in socially responsible ways.3 Evidence suggests that public pen-
sions and socially responsible investment funds prefer rms with higher CSR ratings while
institutional investors overall prefer rms with lower CSR ratings (Di Giuli and Kostovetsky,
2014). In this paper we develop a model to explore the asset-pricing implications of di¤ering
1Note that CSR and public relations (PR) activities are often undertaken to mitigate negative publicity
related to production externalities. We classify CSR and PR activities as externalities broadly because they
are peripheral to or indirect consequences of the rms production process.
2Clark and Viehs (2014) provide a review of the literature on CSR and related concepts, focusing on their
potential e¤ects on rmsnancial and market performance and costs of capital. Huang and Watson (2015)
review the CSR literature appearing in accounting journals.
3The Forum for Sustainable and Responsible Investment reports that, based on research in mid-
2012, $3.31 trillion in US-domiciled assets was held by 443 institutional investors, 272 money man-
agers and 1,000-plus community investing institutions that select or analyze their portfolios using vari-
ous ESG [environmental, community, or other societal or corporate governance] criteria. (URL: http:
//www.ussif.org/blog_home.asp?Display=6, accessed April 30, 2014).
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tastes among investors, building on Fama and French (2007). Specically, we assume that a
representative rm has a production technology that results in stochastic dividends as well
as CSR outcomes and that there are two types of investors. While all investors value cash
ows similarly, only a fraction of investors value the CSR outcome, which we model as a
second output dimension. In this regard, our model departs from the CSR models of Baron
(2007, 2009) that focus on rms donating realized cash ows. Our model generates results
concerning stock prices, expected returns, market reactions to information, corporate spin-
o¤s, and rms investment choices that di¤er in several ways from standard CAPM-style
models where investorspreferences are homogeneous.
Our analysis starts with a model of a pure exchange economy with a single risky asset
and perfectly competitive, risk-averse investors. We assume that there are two types of
investors who we label type 1 and type 2. The risky asset represents shares in a rm that
generates cash and engages in CSR activities, both of which are uncertain. Investors have
homogeneous information but heterogeneous tastes. All investors value cash ows, but CSR
activities are valued only by type-2 investors. The model features a trading round in which
the price of the risky asset is established and a payout round in which the risky outcomes
(e.g., a liquidating dividend and CSR performance) are realized and consumed by investors
according to their share ownership. While we assume that type-2 investors derive utility
from owning shares in socially responsible rms, similar to Fama and French (2007) and
Gollier and Pouget (2012), we di¤er from these studies in that we assume that the utility
that type-2 investors derive from these shares is not xed but depends on the actual CSR
performance.4
We analyze the equilibrium share price and nd that the mean and variance of both
output dimensions are priced as long as there is a non-trivial fraction of type-2 investors
participating in the market. Since we analyze a model with a continuum of heterogeneous
4While type-1 and type-2 investors may benet from the rms pro-social activities even in the absence of
share ownership (e.g., lower pollution) we abstract from such welfare externalities to focus on the implications
of investor tastes over investments.
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risk-averse investors, there is no marginal investor but, instead, shares are priced according
to the weighted average preferences of investors. This is similar to a setting where investors
have homogeneous preferences but heterogeneous information or heterogeneous beliefs about
the distribution of cash ows, where share prices are also dened by average beliefs.5
Our one-period model of investors with heterogeneous preferences di¤ers from heterogeneous-
information models in key ways. First, in our model investors do not use price to glean any
information, in contrast to typical rational-expectations heterogeneous-information models
where price is a valuable signal of other investorsinformation (e.g., Lambert et al., 2007).
Second, while our single-period price is the same as that in an agree-to-disagreemodel, in
our model no investor ends up being wrongin the sense that their beliefs were not rational
(e.g., Harris and Raviv, 1993). This implies that there is no need to specify a correct
outcome distribution or use di¤erent distributions for di¤erent investors. Third, as the time
span represented by a one-period model expands, agree-to-disagreeassumptions become
less plausible because beliefs should converge over time as information is revealed.6 Heteroge-
neous preferences, in contrast, provide no rationale for long-term convergence. Information,
however, still plays an important role when investors have heterogeneous preferences.
We investigate the impact of information in Section 5 where we allow for two rounds
of trading. Investors rst form portfolios based on their prior beliefs. Information arrives,
through, for instance, the rms public disclosures, and investors rebalance their portfolios
by trading based on their revised beliefs. This allows us to derive predictions about the
expected costs of capital, returns, and trading around information releases related to both
cash ows and CSR outcomes. We nd that expected returns and price reactions attributable
to CSR disclosures are not only a¤ected by how much information such disclosure provides
about CSR outcomes, but also by how much information concurrent disclosures provide
5More generally, Lintner (1969) and Rubinstein (1974) discuss conditions under which prices can be
written as a weighted average of investorsbeliefs and preference parameters. Our setting satises these
conditions.
6Kondor (2012) and Kim and Verrecchia (1994) present exceptions in which learning about other traders
beliefs and heterogeneous processing skills, respectively, cause tradersvaluations to diverge even when they
receive the same information.
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about cash ows. Only type-2 investors value the CSR-related information, so it is their
trades and holdings that cause CSR to inuence prices. The inuence of CSR on prices and
returns therefore depends on the fraction of shares owned by type-2 investors before and
after informative disclosures, and this fraction, in turn, depends on all investorsuncertainty
about cash ows.
Furthermore, in contrast to prior studies involving heterogeneous beliefs and information
that derive no-trade results (e.g., Milgrom and Stokey, 1982), we nd that informative
disclosures almost always cause positive trading volume. Even though all investors agree on
the information content of the disclosures, heterogeneous preferences drive trade because the
same information causes the di¤erent investor types to rebalance their portfolios in di¤erent
ways.
In Section 4 we extend the model to capture a corporate spin-o¤ and nd that, because
each new rms shareholder base will generally not be the same as that of the original single
rm, total market capitalization can increase or decrease around a spin-o¤. Consequently,
a spin-o¤ can provide the rm with an opportunity to tailor its shareholder base in a way
that increases the total share price. In particular, separating one rm into two allows for
improved risk sharing between investors, which increases share price. However, as a result
of the change in shareholder base, the pricing of the expected CSR outcome changes as well.
This causes the spin-o¤ to reduce total stock price when the expected CSR outcome is very
high, but also allows the split to be even more value-enhancing when the expected CSR
outcome is negative. We therefore predict that managers motivated to increase stock prices
are more likely to spin o¤ business segments that have negative expected CSR performance
(e.g., the so-called sin stocks) but keep segments with positive expected CSR performance.
4
2 Related literature
Our study builds on the recent literature on investor taste and disagreement. Fama and
French (2007) provide a framework for asset pricing when investors disagree about funda-
mentals or have heterogeneous private valuations (i.e., taste). They focus on situations where
investors either derive a non-random utility from their share holdings or where fundamental
returns inuence tastes for assets. In our setting the extra taste-based utility derived from
share holdings is risky, because it depends on a risky CSR outcome, and does not depend
on nancial returns, because we assume additively separable utility and no covariance be-
tween fundamentals and CSR. Rahi and Zigrand (2014) explore how di¤erences in private
valuations a¤ect the informativeness of price. Jarrow (1980) examines potential e¤ects of
short-sale restrictions in a market where investors have di¤erent preferences. As in these
studies, our taste-based model is closely related to models featuring investors who disagree
about the distributions of nancial returns (e.g., Harris and Raviv, 1993; He and Shi, 2012).
We discuss this and other interpretations of our model in Section 6.2.
Our model generates results related to recent studies on the importance of information
about rmsCSR activities and rmscommitments to disclosing such information. Dhaliwal
et al. (2011, 2012) nd that CSR disclosures a¤ect analyst following and the properties of
analystsforecasts, potentially by changing the demand for analysts indirectly through an
e¤ect on the rms investor base. Serafeim (2014) nds that rms that integrate their report-
ing of nancial performance and sustainability activities (i.e., a dimension of CSR) tend to
experience a shift towards more long-term and less short-term institutional investors. Mar-
tin and Moser (2014), in a controlled laboratory experiment, nd that investors positively
value managersdecisions to contribute to an environmental charity, and respond positively
to disclosures of such contributions even when they reduce rm cash ows. Bénabou and Ti-
role (2010) discuss relations between individual and corporate social responsibility, and their
potential benets and costs to social welfare. They highlight the importance of information
about CSR and how well-studied issues in nancial reporting (e.g., reporting externalities,
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intermediaries, aggregation, and benchmarking) are also important to CSR reporting. Baron
(2007, 2009) and Gra¤Zivin and Small (2005) present models with investors who value rms
charitable contributions or activities to mitigate externalities (termed moral management)
in a setting where investors can also contribute their own cash for similar purposes. These
studies develop some results on how investor preferences for moral management [MH: John
suggested moral management seems more specic and that we could be more general and just
use CSR (or externalities)]can a¤ect stock prices that relate closely to special cases of our
baseline model, but the focus of these studies is generally on why and how managers choose
to engage in costly CSR activities including charitable donations. Bagnoli and Watts (2014)
explicitly model uncertainty about a rms CSR activities, providing a justication based on
information asymmetry for CSR disclosures and assurance of such disclosures. Their setting
includes both Bayesian and heuristic users of the disclosures who are not necessarily investors
and, as such, Bagnoli and Watts (2014) do not model a capital market or pricing mechanism
explicitly. In contrast, we focus on a capital market setting with symmetric information to
show how information a¤ects returns and share holdings when some investors, while rational,
gain utility from CSR (e.g., due to a warm glowor consumption benet).
CSR disclosures could be related to returns because they are indirectly informative about
the rms future cash ows or because some investors intrinsically care whether a company,
for example, pays a fair wage and provides acceptable working conditions to all of its employ-
ees. In their review of the literature, Cheng et al. (2014) note that CSR activities could a¤ect
corporate nancial performance by inuencing stakeholder (e.g., employee) engagement or
product market demand and by providing private benets to managers that are costly to
shareholders, akin to free-cash ow problems. Given the multitude of e¤ects on employees,
customers, and managers, it is not surprising that the empirical evidence on the relation be-
tween CSR and corporate nancial performance is mixed and inconclusive (see, Cheng et al.
(2014), Clark and Viehs (2014), and Bénabou and Tirole (2010)). While the associations
between CSR and nancial performance are important, our model abstracts away from such
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links. Our focus is instead more aligned with recent research showing that CSR activities are
associated with shareholder base or clientele e¤ects. Kim et al. (2014), for example, provide
evidence that rms with higher CSR ratings have broader ownership more institutional
and individual investors hold these rmsshares. They also nd that higher CSR ratings are
associated with greater demand for information as reected in Google and EDGAR search
volume. Dhaliwal et al. (2011) nd that rms initiating disclosure of CSR activities, who
presumably have positive CSR activities to disclose, tend to attract institutional investors.
Robinson et al. (2011) and Hawn et al. (2014) show that the addition of a rm to the Dow
Jones Sustainability Index is associated with positive abnormal returns, consistent with in-
creased investor demand for shares of rms with positive and visible CSR indicators. These
ndings corroborate our predictions that CSR is associated with investor holdings and that
there is complementarity between rm information (about both CSR and fundamentals) and
investor demand driven by CSR expectations.
In the next section we introduce the basic model that has one trading round before the
risky outputs are realized. Section 4 introduces the possibility of corporate spin-o¤s. In
Section 5 we introduce a second round of trading in the same asset after information is
released but before all uncertainty is resolved. This enables us to make predictions about
the rms expected stock returns without having to assume that the rms shareholder base
remains constant. Finally, in Section 6 we discuss alternative interpretations of our model,
derive implications beyond a CSR framework, and conclude.
3 The basic model
As a rst step, we consider a two-period model with a single rm: in the rst period investors
choose portfolios and in the second period the assets in the portfolios realize value. There is
one risk-free asset, money, which has a constant price and return of 1, and one risky asset,
which represents ownership shares in the rm. We assume that the rm generates per-share
7
cash ows of ~x which result in a liquidating dividend. Furthermore, we express the outcome
of the rms production externalities (i.e., the CSR outcome) in dollar terms as ~y per share.7
We assume that all random variables are normally distributed, with
E [~x] = x, V ar [~x] = 2x,
E [~y] = y, V ar [~y] = 2y, and
Cov [~x; ~y] = 0.
Cash ows and CSR outcomes are not correlated. This precludes investors from using in-
formation about ~y to make inferences about ~x. Therefore, the zero-covariance assumption
allows us to abstract from results that are based on using ~y to learn about fundamentals
represented by ~x. Allowing Cov [~x; ~y] 6= 0 would not qualitatively a¤ect our results, as we
show in Appendix B.8
3.1 Investors and their preferences
There is a continuum of risk-averse investors, with unit mass, who can invest in the rms
shares and the risk-free asset. While all investors have constant absolute risk aversion
(CARA) and value ~x, only a fraction,  2 [0; 1], of the investors values ~y. We distin-
guish investors by using the index i 2 f1; 2g to denote type-1 and type-2 investors. That is,
type-1 investors are indi¤erent across realizations of ~y, while type-2 investorsutility depends
non-trivially on ~y.9 We focus on a two-type setting as the most parsimonious way to capture
7We can think of the rms shares as claims to bundled outcomes. There may be scope for an intermediary
or the rm to unbundle the rms cash ows and CSR activities and sell shares of ~x and shares of ~y separately.
If this unbundling is costly, we expect it to be imperfect and for bundling to persist in equilibrium. For
example, it is nearly impossible to perfectly unbundle a rms treatment of its employees from the rms
cash ows. For simplicity, we do not explore the possibility of unbundling here, but address it in Section 4
on spin-o¤s.
8Empirically, the relation between CSR and nancial performance seems ambiguous (see the discussion
in Hirigoyen and Poulain-Rehm (2014)). Our assumption simply implies that one-period CSR performance
and nancial performance are stochastically independent.
9Type-2 investorsvaluation of ~y could be due to a warm glowrelated to being an owner of a rm with
a positive externality (Andreoni, 1989).
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heterogeneous taste over production externalities or CSR. We assume that a type-1 investors
utility is given by u1 =   exp [ r (q1~x+ l1)], where q1 and l1 represent the quantities of shares
in the risky and risk-free asset held by the type-1 investor, respectively, and p represents the
rms price per share. The utility of type-2 investors is multiplicatively separable in ~x and
~y such that u2 =   exp [ r (q2~x+ l2)]  exp [ rq2~y] =   exp [ r (q2 (~x+ ~y) + l2)].
We e¤ectively assume that type-2 investors are risk averse in both output dimensions
(e.g., cash ows and CSR). While the risk aversion assumption is standard with regard to
cash ows, there is no current standard for whether investors are, on average, risk averse,
risk neutral, or risk seeking with regard to outcomes like CSR. The nature of some of our
results depend on type-2 investors caring about risk related to ~y, so some curvature in their
utility with respect to ~y is important. Without curvature, they would not care about the
variance of ~y, and this would change how they react to information. Consistent with our
characterization of risk averse type-2 investors, recent experimental evidence suggests that
individual donors are risk averse in the outcomes that stem from their donations (e.g., Brock
et al., 2013; Exley, 2015). That is, recent experimental evidence provides a basis for assuming
that individuals are risk averse in outcomes other than cash ows.10
Each investor maximizes her expected terminal utility subject to the budget constraint
wi = qip+ li, where wi is the initial wealth endowment. Substituting the budget constraint,
it is straightforward to show that maximizing expected utility is equivalent to maximizing
the following certainty equivalent:
CEi = qi (E [~vi]  p)  1
2
rq2i V ar [~vi] , (1)
where ~v1 = ~x and ~v2 = ~x + ~y denote the value of the rms per-share outcome to type-1
and type-2 investors, respectively. This implies that V ar [~v1] = V ar [~x] = 2x and V ar [~v2] =
V ar [~x] + V ar [~y] = 2x + 
2
y.
10Furthermore, Lam et al. (2015, abstract) nd that rms with unclear overall CSR performance (positive
performance in some dimensions and negative performance in others) are mispriced by the market compared
to their neutralpeers, plausibly due to the ambiguity in their social performance.
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To maximize e¢ ciency it is benecial to: (i) allocate the cash ow risk such that each in-
vestor holds the same amount, since all investors are equally risk averse; (ii) allocate the CSR
outcome risk such that type-1 investors hold all of it; and (iii) allocate the expected CSR
outcome such that type-2 (type-1) investors hold any possible positive (negative) amount.
The three e¢ ciency dimensions cannot be satised simultaneously because they imply dif-
ferent allocations of shares across investors. In equilibrium, share allocations and the price
of the risky asset will reect the balancing of the three dimensions of e¢ ciency.
3.2 Baseline equilibrium asset price
Maximizing CEi as given in (1) yields the optimal demand for a type-i investor:
qi =
E [~vi]  p
rV ar [~vi]
. (2)
Prices are set such that aggregate demand equals aggregate supply. There is one share per
investor so that, on average, the following market-clearing condition has to hold
(1  ) q1 + q2 = 1. (3)
Lemma 1 shows the equilibrium stock price, which is derived by substituting investors
optimal demand into the market-clearing condition.11
Lemma 1 The share price, p, is given by
p = x  r2x +
2x
2x + (1  )2y
 
y   r2y

. (4)
On a fundamental level, Lemma 1 shows that non-cash ow related outputs of a rm are
priced when a fraction of investors value these outputs. Note that when  ! 0, the price
11Our expression for price in Lemma 1 is equivalent to the price that would prevail in an agree-to-disagree
exchange economy with heterogeneous beliefs, and could be derived using the consensus beliefs methodology
of Lintner (1969) and Rubinstein (1975), and as discussed in He and Shi (2012).
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approaches that in the standard framework with only type-1 investors, i.e., p=0 = x  r2x.
When  ! 1, the price approaches that in a standard framework with y as a second cash
ow, i.e., p=1 = x + y   r
 
2x + 
2
y

. In general, price is a weighted average of the price
when  ! 0 and the price when  ! 1: p = (1  ) p=0 + p=1, where  = 2x2x+(1 )2y .
The fact that price reects a weighted average of investorspreferences is similar to settings
where all investors value cash ows but have di¤erent beliefs or information (e.g., Milgrom
and Stokey, 1982). One main di¤erence in our setting is that the second dimension is not
necessarily cash-ow related. Additionally, all investors agree on the distributions of both
dimensions.
Furthermore, because only type-2 investors are interested in the CSR outcome, the
weight, , on y-related terms in the price equation in (4) is determined by the amount
of shares held by type-2 investors. A naive guess is that a fraction  are held by type-2
investors, reecting their market presence. However, this is not the case because individuals
holding decisions are determined by expected returns and the riskiness of returns, which vary
across investor classes. In equilibrium, the per-share holdings of type-1 and type-2 investors
are given by
(1  ) q1 = (1  )
 
r
y +
 
2x + 
2
y

2x + (1  )2y
and (5)
q2 = 
1 
r
y + 2x
2x + (1  )2y
. (6)
The weight  is in fact di¤erent from  because CSR outcome risk causes type-2 investors to
reduce their demand for the rms shares. The impact of type-2 investors on the pricing of
expected CSR outcomes is the same as their inuence on the pricing of the riskiness of CSR
outcomes, consistent with their pricing power being driven by their positions in the risky
asset.
Corollary 1 provides comparative static results for the price in (4).
Corollary 1 Equilibrium share price increases in the expected value of ~y, and can increase
11
or decrease in the fraction of type-2 investors and the variances of cash ows and CSR
outcomes: dp
dy
> 0, dp
d
/  y   r2y ? 0, dpd2y /   (y (1  ) + r2x) ? 0, and dpd2x /  r +
y(1 )2y
4x+(1 )(2x+2y)
2 ? 0.
Corollary 1 analyzes the e¤ects of the four essential parameters in our model: the fraction
of type-2 investors; the expected CSR outcome; and the variances of cash ows and CSR
outcomes. While  parameterizes the heterogeneity of the population, the remaining 3
parameters a¤ect the utilities of investors who hold shares in the asset. Specically, holding
price constant, while an increase in 2x decreases the expected utility of all traders, an increase
in y (2y) increases (decreases) a type-2 investors utility but does not a¤ect a type-1 investors
utility.
Taken together, an increase in y increases the equilibrium price through two e¤ects that
reinforce each other. First, y has a direct positive impact on price. Second, increasing y
makes type-2 investors trade more positively which further increases the positive impact of
y on price. The uncertainty about cash ows and CSR outcomes a¤ects how y inuences
price, since the uncertainties a¤ect the demands from type-1 and type-2 investors (i.e., the
endogenous degree of investor clienteles). Specically, the e¤ect of y on price is increasing in
2x and is decreasing in 
2
y. That is, an increase in 
2
y causes type-2 investors to take weaker
positions and to discount expected outcomes more. If y is positive (or not too negative), then
this has a negative e¤ect on price. For su¢ ciently negative y (i.e., y << 0), the e¤ect of an
increase in 2y can be positive, since higher 
2
y decreases the type-2 investorsshareholdings
which, in turn decreases the negative inuence of y on price.
Increases in the fraction of type-2 investors, , can have positive or negative e¤ects. The
reason is that while type-2 investors include y in their valuation of the rms shares, they also
include 2y. Therefore, when the expected CSR outcome is su¢ ciently positive (i.e., y > r
2
y),
increasing the fraction of type-2 investors has a positive e¤ect on price because they impound
the positive y more strongly into price. When this is not the case (i.e., y < r2y), the negative
e¤ect of an increase in type-2 investors is driven by an increase in the total risk perceived
12
by the rms shareholder base.
There are two potentially countervailing e¤ects of increasing 2x on the rms share price.
First, an increase in 2x increases the risk perceived by all investors. Second, an increase in
2x increases the equilibrium share holdings of type-2 investors. While higher values of 
2
x
decrease the demand of all investors (holding price constant) this e¤ect is stronger for type-1
investors. In equilibrium, price decreases and the total amount of shares held by type-2
investors increases. When investors have homogeneous preferences, an increase in risk has
an unambiguously negative e¤ect on price (i.e., lim!0
dp
d2x
= lim!1
dp
d2x
=  r). However,
when y is su¢ ciently positive (i.e., y >
r(2x+2y)
2
2y
+ r
4
x
2y(1 )), the second e¤ect can dominate
the rst and an increase in risk associated with ~x increases the rms stock price.
4 Spin-o¤s
In this section we analyze whether investor taste for CSR can play a role in rmsspin-o¤
(or merger) decisions. The baseline model shows that the rms shareholder base is a result
of its fundamental parameters (the distribution of cash and CSR outcomes) and that the
price of the rm, in turn, depends on the shareholder base. When a rm spins o¤ a part of
its business into a separate company, the fundamental parameters of the two rms will di¤er
from those of the original company. This in turn implies that the aggregate shareholder base
of the company will change, which could provide rms with an avenue to increase equity
value.
As an example, take Altria, which in the early 2000s was a conglomerate including tobacco
(Philip Morris) and packaged food (Kraft) businesses. In the context of our model, type-2
investors might have an aversion to investing in a tobacco business, but would not have the
same aversion to investing in a packaged food business. In 2007, Altria spun o¤ its Kraft
Foods segment and stated that The separation of Altria and Kraft will [...] permit Altria
and Kraft to target their respective shareholder bases more e¤ectively... .12
12Altria Group Inc. Press Release dated March 30, 2007, and accessed on March 16, 2015 at
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To stay with the Altria example, we begin with a unied rm with output components ~xu
and ~y. The cash ow component has two sub-components, ~xu = ~xk + ~xa, with the subscript
u denoting a unied rm. The setup allows us to model a spin-o¤ of ~xk (e.g., Krafts cash
ows) from the still-bundled ~xa and ~y (e.g., Altrias cash ows and CSR performance).13 We
assume that the random output components are distributed independently and normally,
such that, similar to above,
E [~xi] = xi, V ar [~xi] = 2xi > 0,
E [~y] = y, V ar [~y] = 2y > 0, and
Cov [~xk; ~xa] = Cov [~xi; ~y] = 0, 8i 2 fk; ag . (7)
The unied rm can be traded as one rm or split into two rms. If the rm splits, the
outputs of the two rms are ~xa for rm a and ~xk + ~y for rm k.
From equation (4) above, the share price of the unied rm, pu, can be written as
pu = xu   r2xu +
 
y   r2y
 2xu
2xu + (1  )2y
. (8)
We assume that a spin-o¤ results in one share of rm a and one share of rm k per investor.
This implies that investors will face the exact same risk per capita, irrespective of the spin-
o¤, such that there is no benet from diversication. With this assumption, the post-split
http://investor.altria.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=80855&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=956368. Note that the spin-o¤
was well-anticipated and motivated by additional purposes (e.g., management focus and corporate debt ca-
pacity) that are outside of our model. Furthermore, we make no attempt to examine price reactions around
specic dates or attribute abnormal returns or volume to shareholder base e¤ects. Instead, we focus on the
market valuation of the rm either as a single unit or as two spun-o¤ components.
13The uncertainty in ~y could be related to the realized health impact of Philipp Morris cigarettes and the
unknown extent of cigarette marketing directed at teenagers and children.
14
prices for rms 1 and 2, pk and pa, are,14
pk = xk   r2xk , and (9)
pa = xa   r2xa +
 
y   r2y
 2xa
2xa + (1  )2y
. (10)
In the comparison of the unied rm with the split rm we focus on the total market value,
as market value is important in a number of settings closely related to our model. Market
value corresponds to the expected utility of an unmodeled entrepreneur (or prior period
shareholders) who is selling her shares in the rm. If the entrepreneur sells all her shares
before any consumption occurs or information is released, price is a deterministic function
of known parameters and the entrepreneur is not exposed to any risk. Similarly, in an over-
lapping generations model, an older generation of shareholders who have already consumed
last-periods ~x and ~y are only concerned with the deterministic price they receive from sell-
ing shares. We are therefore agnostic about the type or risk-aversion of the hypothetical
entrepreneur (or of the initial shareholders). Alternatively, a manager compensated on the
basis of stock price would be interested in maximizing stock price, and would similarly face
no price-related risk. Finally, price is observable in public markets, which facilitates empir-
ical tests. Our assumption of one share in each rm per investor both pre- and post-split
implies that the total market value of the two rms post-split exceeds that of the unied
rm whenever pk + pa > pu. The following proposition investigates when a spin-o¤ increases
the market value of the rm.
Proposition 1 When  2 (0; 1), the total market value of the split rms is greater than the
market value of the unied rm if and only if r2y > y. If  = 0,  = 1 or r
2
y = y, then
pa + pk = pu.
When  = 1 or  = 0, splitting the unied rm (or combining rms a and k) has no e¤ect
on total stock price. If investors are homogeneous, there is no scope for shareholder base
14We derive prices in a two-rm economy in the proof to Proposition 1 in the Appendix.
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e¤ects, and splitting the rm has no e¤ect under our assumptions. In other words, merely
creating two independent securities does not in and of itself improve risk sharing.
The r2y > y condition in Proposition 1 consists of two terms, one for the mean of CSR,
y, and one for the e¤ect of CSR variance on type-2 investors, r2y. The intuition for the
condition relates to the importance of risk sharing in a market with heterogeneous investors.
Specically, the CSR variance term captures the risk-sharing benet of splitting the rm.
Type-1 and type-2 investors disagree about the risk of rm a. When the rms are bundled
together, both types of investors are e¤ectively forced to hold the same proportional exposure
to rms a and k. When the rms are split, each type of investor adjusts their proportional
holdings in rms a and k. This implies that with a split rm, type-2 investors can decrease
their exposure to ~y such that the CSR risk is borne by investors that are willing to hold this
risk at no extra cost. Risk related to ~y causes type-2 investors hold fewer shares of rm a
than they would hold in the unied rm.
In other words, unbundling ~xk from ~xa + ~y provides the capital market with an option
to improve risk sharing, which increases the total share price. However, the improved risk
sharing can be costly. Specically, since fewer shares of rm a are held by type-2 investors,
the extent to which the expected CSR outcome is priced decreases. This increases total share
price whenever the mean is negative, y < 0, but is costly whenever the mean is positive,
y > 0. Proposition 1 implies that rms should be more likely to spin-o¤ segments of their
business that have negative externalities and should be more likely to remain unied or
merge with segments that have positive externalities.
The takeaway from this section is that shareholder base can play an important role
in the capital market value created or destroyed in agglomerations, conglomerations, spin-
o¤s, and divestment decisions. There are, of course, other channels through which value is
destroyed or created in conglomerates and spin-o¤s, including managerial focus, divisional
cross-subsidization, e¢ ciencies and ine¢ ciencies of internal capital markets, tax benets of
greater debt capacity, and information asymmetries within and across rms (see Berger and
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Ofek, 1995, for a discussion). Our simple model abstracts from these channels and shows
how shareholder base e¤ects can favor or inhibit spin-o¤ decisions. These e¤ects provide a
basis for the benet of the Altria-Kraft split described above.
5 Price reactions, expected returns, and trade around
CSR disclosures
This section extends the baseline model in two ways. First, we allow for the disclosure of
information regarding both cash ows and CSR performance. Second, we assume that in-
vestors can trade before and after the disclosures. While modeling the release of information
allows us to derive predictions on how CSR disclosure a¤ects prices, introducing a second
round of trading allows us to discuss expected returns. When investors only care about cash
ows but have heterogeneous beliefs the disclosure of information usually causes the beliefs
to converge. Our model is di¤erent because we focus on preference heterogeneity that is not
directly a¤ected by information or disclosures. However, disclosures still a¤ect beliefs, and,
because of underlying taste heterogeneity, a¤ect the private valuations of di¤erent investors
heterogeneously.
In our model, the release of information causes private valuations to diverge, rather than
to converge. Prior to the information release, all investors maximize the prots from trad-
ing in the rst round. In round 2, after the information release, investors use their rst
round prots to purchase securities that maximize terminal consumption. As such, investors
are homogeneous in the rst round of trading because they agree about the distribution
of the post-information price but rebalance their portfolios to suit their taste-based pref-
erences, yielding heterogeneous portfolios after information is released. As a result of the
rebalancing, the disclosure triggers trade even though all investors have optimal holdings
before information is disclosed and agree on how to interpret the information. This di¤ers
from the no-trade results established by Hakansson et al. (1982), which further suggests that
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heterogeneity of preferences has di¤erent implications than heterogeneity of beliefs.
The standard approach to estimating expected returns in a single-period pure-exchange
model is to compare the expected terminal output or liquidating dividend of the rm with
the rms stock price. While there is no terminal cash ow for a going concern and returns
are realized as the shares are traded on the market, the simplication of focusing on returns
in a static model is usually appropriate as long as investor preferences are homogeneous (i.e.,
as long as the expected stock price at any point in time equals the agreed-upon discounted
expected value of output). In the long run, the uncertainty associated with every component
of output will be revealed and priced accordingly such that the researcher can take the
di¤erence between expected output and the rms stock price as realized returns.
In our model, however, investors with di¤erent preferences disagree about the economic
returns between the second round of trading and the outcome realization round. The reason
is that only some investors value CSR. One potential solution to the problem of calculating
returns would be to use a weighted average based on investor preferences (e.g., rettotal =
  ret1 + (1  )  ret2). However, this ignores investorsholdings, which determine prices.
Since the composition of the shareholder base depends on the current assessed cash-ow risk,
CSR outcome risk, and expected CSR outcome, the composition of the rms shareholder
base can change as information is released. In a one-period model, there is no scope for the
shareholder base to change endogenously and, therefore, no scope for returns related to such
changes. In a multi-period model, as we show below, a constant shareholder base only arises
in knife-edge cases.
To capture the e¤ects of potential changes in shareholder base, we add a second trading
period and assume that a nancial disclosure and a CSR disclosure are released between the
rst and second trading rounds. Specically, we extend the above model in the following
way. Investors rst trade in period 1 as described above. In period 2, information about ~x
and ~y is revealed to all market participants through the disclosures and a second round of
trading occurs. The outputs ~x and ~y are realized in period 3. Since investors are not wealth
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constrained and live for the entire life of the rm without liquidity shocks, each investors
demand in each of the two periods can be computed independent of all other demands.
The revealed information in period 2 is given by two information signals which are inde-
pendent of each other. Let the signals be
~m = ~x+ ~"m, and (11)
~n = ~y + ~"n, (12)
where ~"m and ~"n are noise terms that are independent of all other random variables, with:
"m  N

0;
1
m

and (13)
"n  N

0;
1
n

, (14)
where  i denotes the precision of signal i. Furthermore, let x = 1=2x and  y = 1=
2
y be
the prior precisions of ~x and ~y, respectively. As before, demand is given by the solution to
investorswealth-maximization problem, which, in the second round, takes a similar form as
in the baseline model. Let qi;2 be the shares held by a type-i investor after the second round
of trade. Equilibrium second-period share demand from investor i is
qi;2 =
E [~vijm;n]  p2
rV ar [~vijm;n] , (15)
where p2 denotes the second round price. The posterior distributions are given byE [~xjm;n] =
xx+mm
x+m
, E [~yjm;n] = yy+nn
y+n
, V ar [~xjm;n] = 1
x+m
and V ar [~yjm;n] = 1
y+n
. We denote
 0x = x + m and 
0
y =  y + n the posterior precisions of the investorsbeliefs regarding x
and y, respectively.
In the rst round of trading, investors e¤ectively maximize their short-term prots, which
is equivalent to maximizing the risk-adjusted budget available in the second round of trading
for purchasing securities that generate terminal consumption. Maximizing short-term prots
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is achived by choosing
q1i =
E [p2]  p1
rV ar [p2]
. (16)
Note that q11 = q12, which implies that in the rst round of trading both types of investor
have the same demand for shares in the rm. Substituting the investorsdemands into the
market clearing condition yields the rst and second round prices in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 The rms prices before and after disclosure are given by
p1 = x  r
x
+

1 + (1  )  0x
 0y
0@y   r 1
 0y
1 + (1  )  0x
 0y
+  n
y
1 + (1  )  0x
 0y
1A and (17)
p2 =
xx +mm
 0x
  r 1
 0x
+

1 + (1  )  0x
 0y

y y + nn
 0y
  r 1
 0y

. (18)
Similar to the single period setting, price in both rounds of trading includes the expected
value of cash ows, conditional on all available information. Although investors receive no
cash ows before trading in round 2, p1 includes the expected value of p2, and therefore
includes x by the law of iterated expectations. While the same holds true for the expected
CSR outcome, only a fraction 

1 + (1  )  0x
 0y
 1
of shares will be held by type-2 investors
after the second round of trading. This implies that the expected round 2 shareholdings of
type-2 investors matter for the price impact of y on the round 1 price. Note that the risk
premium in the second round is the same as the risk premium in our single period setting,
using conditional distributions. In the rst round, investors are not interested in the un-
certainty about the terminal consumption but, instead, in the uncertainty about the second
round price. This implies that the discount in p1 relative to the weighted expected consump-
tion stems both from uncertainty about the second period price and from the predictable
discount in the second-period price generated by consumption uncertainty. To separate these
two sources of risk, the following corollary establishes the expected returns from the rst to
the second round of trading (i.e., the cost of capital).
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Corollary 2 The expected stock return, which we use as a proxy for the cost of capital, is
given by R = E
h
p2 p1
p1
i
= E[p2 p1]
p1
, where
E [p2   p1] = r m
x 0x
+
0@ 
1 + (1  )  0x
 0y
1A2 r n
 0y y
. (19)
We express the expected change in price in (19) as the sum of two terms: the rst term
reects a reduction in risk related to ~x and the second term reects a reduction in risk
related to ~y. Similar to the classical pure-exchange model, the expected return decreases
in the expected value of cash ows, x, and the expected CSR output, y.15 This happens
because an increase in x or y is associated with an increase in the denominator in expected
returns (p1) but no change in the numerator (E [p2   p1]).
Similar to a setting where investors have homogeneous preferences, the expected price
change is a result of the uncertainty regarding the second round price being resolved through
the disclosures. While investors in the rst round only bear risk that relates to the disclosure
event, V ar [p2], the expected value that they receive, E [p2], includes a discount that is
proportional to the residual uncertainty. The rst term in (19), r m
x 0x
, is the discount that
investors demand for the exposure to price changes from the cash ow related disclosure.
The rst round price in (17) includes a discount for the unconditional cash ow variance,
which equals the sum of cash ow related price risk that investors bear in the rst round and
cash ow related consumption risk that they bear in the second round, i.e., 1
x
= m
x 0x
+ 1
 0x
.
A similar intuition holds for the CSR related risk. However, the price change that results
from the CSR disclosure is muted (relative to the change induced by the cash ow disclosure)
because only some investors value CSR.16 Therefore, while all investors demand a premium
for the uncertain price change that the CSR disclosure creates, only type-2 investors demand
15In discussing expected returns, we assume the parameters are such that p1 > 0 so a positive expected
return implies E [p2] > p1.
16The cost of capital in Corollary 2 is increased by type-2 investors, and is increasing in . This is similar
in spirit to the result in Bloomeld and Fischer (2011, p. 53) that cost of capital is increased by the extent
to which each type believes the other is responding to data that are not value relevant.
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a premium for holding CSR related risk in the second round of trading. Specically, in
round 2 a fraction 

1 + (1  )  0x
 0y
 1
of shares are held by type-2 investors. Only these
investors respond to the CSR disclosure such that the variance of the price driven by type-
2 investors reacting to information is proportional to



1 + (1  )  0x
 0y
 12
. Similar to
the cash ow related risk, the discount in p1 for CSR risk is the sum of the discount in
the second round, 
1+(1 )  0x
 0y
r 1
 0y
, and the CSR related variance in the second round price,


1 + (1  )  0x
 0y
 12
r 1
 0y
n
y
.
Finally, following the impact of cash ow related risks on the shareholder base that we
discussed in Corollary 1, the cash ow risk that remains after the disclosure impacts the
pricing of CSR based risk. For example, when the cash ow disclosure is perfectly precise
(i.e., when  0x approaches positive innity) then all shares in the second round will be held
by type-1 investors and price does not change as a response to the CSR disclosure (that is,
limm!1E [p2   p1] = r=x). That is, the precision of cash ow disclosure determines the
pricing of the CSR disclosure.
Since investors react to the disclosure of information, the price in Proposition 2 encom-
passes reaction coe¢ cients to the two disclosed signals. While there is ample literature
on earnings response coe¢ cients (Kothari (2001) provides a review), to our knowledge we
are the rst to analytically develop a response coe¢ cient to CSR disclosure. Proposition 3
analyzes the market response to CSR disclosure.
Proposition 3 The price reaction to CSR disclosure is determined by the following response
coe¢ cient
 =
n
 y + n
 
1 + (1  ) x+m
y+n
. (20)
The CSR response coe¢ cient increases in the precision of CSR disclosure and in the fraction
of type-2 investors. The CSR response coe¢ cient decreases in the precision of nancial
disclosure, the prior precision of cash ows, and the prior precision of the CSR outcome.
That is, d
dn
 0 ,d
d
 0 , d
dm
 0, d
dx
 0, and d
dy
 0.
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Proposition 3 shows that some of the conjectures from the literature on earnings response
coe¢ cients carry over to our CSR response coe¢ cient. That is, a higher precision of the
report and a lower ex ante precision of CSR outcomes increase the price reaction to the CSR
disclosure. Intuitively, a higher fraction of investors who are interested in CSR performance
increases the price response to the disclosure. Furthermore, while CSR outcomes and cash
ows are not correlated in our model, the characteristics of the nancial disclosure have an
impact on the price reaction to CSR disclosure. The reason is the endogenous shareholder
base composition. Specically, if the posterior precision of cash ows relative to CSR out-
comes increases, then more shares will be held by type-1 investors, which reduces the price
impact of the CSR disclosure.
The above discussion emphasizes the idea that the rms shareholder base is an equi-
librium outcome a¤ected by prior beliefs and the arrival of information. This implies that
information arrival causes investors to trade, giving rise to trading volume across investor
types. Since shares will be sold from one type of investor to the other type, market clearing
requires that (1  ) jq1;2   q1;1j =  jq2;2   q2;1j. Trading volume following the disclosure is
therefore given by T = (1  ) jq1;2   q1;1j. Substituting quantities and prices from equations
(15-18) yields the trading volume in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 The trading volume in round 2 is given by
T =
 (1  )
1  + y+n
x+m
1  y y + nnr
 . (21)
First note that there is positive trading volume in our model even though all investors agree
on the properties of the information, and no investor has access to private information or
higher or lower processing costs. As such, trade in our setting is driven by heterogeneity in
the valuation implications of the same information to investors with di¤erent tastes. When
more information is disclosed regarding CSR outcomes and when the expected CSR outcome
increases, then type-2 investors will increase their holdings in the rm by buying shares
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from type-1 investors. Additionally, it is evident from equation (21) that volume around an
information arrival (e.g., a corporate disclosure) is non-monotonic in the surprise related
to the outcome that is valued heterogeneously by investors, i.e., jn  yj. Indeed, equation
(21) suggests that there is a range over which trading volume is actually decreasing in the
surprise. Finally, note that while a more precise cash ow disclosure always increases trading
volume, this need not be the case with a more precise CSR disclosure.
6 Discussion and conclusion
6.1 Empirical Implications
Our results have a number of empirical implications for researchers interested in the capital
market implications of rmsCSR activities and their disclosures about these activities. We
discuss empirical implications of our model under alternative interpretations (e.g., where ~y
represents other dimensions of investor taste) in the next subsection. All of the empirical im-
plications we highlight are driven by shareholder base e¤ects that follow from our assumption
of heterogeneous investor taste.
First, we nd that investor tastes can cause rmsmarket values to be increasing in the
riskiness of their cash ows, in contrast to the usual result that market value is decreasing in
cash ow risk. This is not a general result, but rather occurs only when the expected CSR
outcomes are su¢ ciently positive. The mechanism underlying this result involves cash ow
risk deterring type-1 investors, allowing type-2 investors who value the rmshigh expected
CSR outcome to have a more signicant inuence on the rms share price. Empirically, this
result can be operationalized in settings where CSR outcomes are likely to be a signicant
driver of investment choices.17
Second, we predict that market responses to disclosures about CSR will be stronger
17While this is unlikely to be descriptive of national stock markets like the NYSE, it is plausibly descriptive
in novel online markets like Kiva, which connects lenders and borrowers online with the explicit goal of
reducing poverty and has facilitated over $600 million in loans from 2005 through mid-2014.
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when the quality of (potentially concurrent) disclosures about fundamentals is lower. This
results from the mix of type-1 and type-2 investors in the marketplace. When the quality of
nancial information is higher, more of the rms shares are held by type-1 investors. The
response to CSR disclosure is muted because a smaller fraction of the rms shareholder
base values CSR performance. Additionally, when the market is primarily composed of
either all type-1 or all type-2 investors, there is little scope for shareholder base e¤ects.
Therefore, the relation between market responses to CSR disclosures and the quality of
cash-ow disclosures is expected to be greatest when there are signicant portions of both
type-1 and type-2 investors, and weakest when the market is dominated by either type-1 or
type-2 investors (i.e.,  = 0 or  = 1). These predictions can be operationalized in public
stock markets with data on investor holdings (e.g., holdings of socially responsible funds)
and proxies for the quality of CSR and fundamental disclosures.
In a setting where CSR disclosures are informative about cash ows, we would also expect
to nd a negative relation between the market response to CSR disclosures and the quality of
disclosures explicitly about fundamentals. To illustrate, consider a rm that discloses a signal
about fundamentals, ~m = ~x+ ~"m, as above, in a setting without type-2 investors, such that
CSR disclosures are used only to make inferences about cash ows. In this example, market
returns would be associated with the CSR disclosure as long as there is noise in the disclosure
about fundamentals (i.e., V ar ["m] 6= 0). As the noise in the disclosure about fundamentals
goes to zero the incremental information from the CSR disclosure disappears and the market
ceases to react to the CSR disclosure. This mechanism, of substitution between informative
signals, however, is very di¤erent from the mechanism we identify based on shareholder
base e¤ects. We caution that an empirical study nding a market price reaction to CSR
disclosures should be wary about inferring that CSR disclosures are informative about cash
ows, because such a reaction could be driven by investor tastes and shareholder base e¤ects.
An e¤ective empirical strategy to disentangle the two competing explanations could test
whether the distribution of the shareholder base a¤ects the negative relation between market
25
reactions to CSR disclosures and the quality of disclosures about fundamentals. The e¤ect
we identify is signicant only with a mix of type-1 and type-2 investors, while the alternative
explanation based on signal substitution should be independent of the mix of shareholders.
Third, we show that the existence of investor tastes can lead to corporate spin-o¤s where
a company decides to split o¤ a section of its business and to list it independently. Such
a spin-o¤ can increase the market value of the original rms equity. The reason for the
potential stock market benet is that the shareholder base of the two individual companies
does not have to equal the shareholder base of the original company. Because the shareholder
base can readjust, splitting the rm allows investors to improve risk sharing, which reduces
the combined risk premium of both rms. However, the improvement in risk sharing has
a second e¤ect: the expected CSR performance receives a di¤erent weight in the combined
prices of the split rms. This implies that companies should have a bigger incentive to spin
o¤ sin stocksthan they do to spin o¤ business segments that have a very positive social
impact.
Fourth, while we do not provide analytical results for this, our analysis provides a channel
for individual social responsibility to yield corporate social responsibility.18 The channel that
we derive is the impact of taste on the rms stock price. That is, managers who are interested
in maximizing stock price have an incentive to invest in projects that yield a positive CSR
outcome even if they are not cash ow maximizing. An investigation of the single-period
stock price suggests that incentives to invest in CSR projects increase in the fraction of type-
2 investors and in cash-ow uncertainty but decrease in CSR uncertainty. In line with the
rst prediction, Naughton et al. (2014) nd that in periods of higher investor sentiment (or
taste) for CSR, managers increase their CSR investment and that this investment does not
result in high future returns.19 The second and third predictions further suggest that rms
18For a more detailed analysis of a rms investment decision when some investors value CSR, see Gollier
and Pouget (2012). They assume that the CSR outcome is certain, conditional on the rms investment
choice, and their results would also hold in our model if we assumed no CSR risk.
19As a measure for investor sentiment, Naughton et al. (2014) compare the market value of rms with
high and low CSR performance. They assume that when this di¤erence is high, investor sentiment for CSR
is strong. In the context of our model, the sentiment measure could measure the fraction of investors that
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investments in CSR are complementary with CSR disclosures and dis-complementary with
fundamental or cash ow disclosure quality. Essentially, when rms improve their expected
CSR outcomes (potentially at the expense of expected cash ows), they want the market to
place more weight on CSR and less weight on cash ows. Firms can achieve this goal by
improving the quality of CSR disclosures to attract more type-2 investors, or by weakening
the quality of cash ow disclosures to deter type-1 investors and increase the proportion of
type-2 investors. We therefore predict that rms engaged in CSR activities will tilt their
disclosure strategies to emphasize CSR and, if possible, weaken the quality of disclosures
about fundamentals. Relatedly, if changes in disclosure standards increase the quality of
mandated CSR disclosures, we predict that rms will invest more in CSR activities, even at
the expense of expected cash ows valued by all investors.
Fifth, with a slight extension, our model is consistent with the existence and increasing
prevalence of mutual funds that choose not to invest in rms with poor expected CSR per-
formance (e.g., the Vanguard FTSE Social Index Fund). Specically, if we were to introduce
short-sale restrictions (a la Jarrow, 1980), then a rm with very poor expected CSR perfor-
mance would in equilibrium be held only by type-1 investors. That is, investors concerned
about CSR would, in the presence of short-sale restrictions, optimally hold zero shares of
this type of rm. An additional implication of a short-sale restriction is that rms with suf-
ciently high expected CSR performance relative to cash ows would be held only by type-2
investors. If cash ows to investors are zero, these rms could be labeled charities, who
receive donations from type-2 investors primarily motivated by expectations of positive CSR
performance. Even with non-zero cash ows, the assets we model could represent lotteries
designed for charitable fund-raising (see, e.g., Landry et al., 2006; Lange et al., 2007).
Sixth, our model helps explain trading volume around informative disclosures, announce-
ments, or other news events. Heterogeneous taste provides a natural foundation for investors
using the same information to update private valuations di¤erently, which then drives trade
have a taste for CSR or how much utility type 2 investors receive from CSR output.
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as investors e¢ ciently rebalance their portfolios.
Finally, our model can help explain the potential for rms with positive expected CSR
performance to have greater stock market returns than rms with zero or negative expected
CSR performance. Petruno (2014) describes how members of the millenial generation are
embracing socially responsibleinvesting,and are entering their prime saving and invest-
ing years, and potentially inherit[ing] trillions of dollars.If the proportion of CSR-sensitive
investors () is increasing over time, then the weight on expected risk-adjusted CSR perfor-
mance (y   r2y) in the pricing function will also be increasing over time. Koh et al. (2014)
suggest that investors pay a premium for saints(identied by a social index) and ask for
a discount to buy sinners (alcohol, gambling, tobacco). An increase in the proportion of in-
vestors that do so will cause an increase in price for positive-CSR rms (i.e., with y r2y > 0)
independent of a relation between CSR performance and cash-ow performance.
6.2 Alternative interpretations beyond CSR
Finally, we discuss applications of our model to areas beyond CSR where investor tastes
have been shown to have an impact on demand for shares. Several empirical studies have
documented areas in which di¤erences in investorspreferences a¤ect stock ownership in the
cross-section. Graham and Kumar (2006) nd evidence for age and tax clienteles related to
dividends, whereby older and lower-income retail investors display a stronger preference for
dividend yields than younger and higher-income retail investors. Jacob et al. (2014) show
that heterogeneous tax-based preferences across owners of closely-held rms a¤ect dividend
policy.20 Harris et al. (2014) nd evidence supporting heterogeneous preferences over payout
policies (dividends vs. capital gains), independent of and often in conict with potential
20Taste di¤erences in our model are closely related to the e¤ects of tax clienteles (e.g., Allen et al., 2000)
but di¤er for a substantive reason. In our model, ~y could represent the extra after-tax payout to investors
facing lower marginal tax rates. In a model that captures tax-based clienteles, ~x and ~y would have to be
perfectly correlated, because di¤erential income tax treatment of equity distributions implies that payouts
to one group are proportional to (i.e., perfectly correlated with) payouts to the other groups. We assume
that ~x and ~y are orthogonal to ensure that type-1 investors cannot use ~y to learn about ~x so that only type-2
investors incorporate information about ~y into their valuations.
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wealth-based preferences over the same payout policies. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000)
nd that di¤erent classes of investors (local vs. foreign) display heterogeneous preferences
for recent stock returns (engaging in momentum vs. contrarian investing strategies). Grin-
blatt and Keloharju (2001) document investor preferences based on cultural and language
similarity to management. Bushee (2001) nds that institutional investors with shorter hori-
zons display a preference for near-term earnings relative to long-term value. The investment
home bias is a pervasive phenomenon, whereby investors prefer to invest in local stocks
rather than foreign or distant stocks (e.g., Coval and Moskowitz, 1999; Huberman, 2001).
While we focus on CSR, our non-cash-ow outcome could straightforwardly be adapted to
one of the applications above.
Investor tastes could also be related to insider status. Cohen (2009) nds that employee
loyalty inuences individualsportfolio preferences in favor of holding their employersstock.
Insiders who obtain private benets of control also can be interpreted as having additional
tastes for owning shares beyond cash ows available to all investors (e.g., Barclay and Hold-
erness, 1989; Dyck and Zingales, 2004). An important di¤erence is that private benets of
control often involve information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders, which would
be between type-1 and type-2 investors in our model. Adding such information asymme-
try would complicate our model and potentially alter some of our ndings related to the
importance of shareholder base.
6.3 Conclusion
This paper presents a simple model that examines the capital market implications of hetero-
geneous investor taste. We link heterogeneous tastes to several predictions related to asset
prices, returns, and rmsinvestment choices. Our results have implications for researchers
and practitioners interested in investor clienteles (i.e., shareholder base e¤ects) and how
endogenous clienteles a¤ect returns, reactions to information, rmsinvestment trade-o¤s,
and diversication. Our model also highlights the importance of distinguishing between rm
29
value based on market prices and fundamental value based on discounted cash ows. In other
words, when investors have taste for non-nancial output, maximizing shareholder value is
not equivalent to maximizing the discounted value of cash ows.
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A Proofs
Lemma 1: The rst order condition to (1) with respect to demand in shares of the risky
asset for an investor of type i is given by
E [~vi]  p  rqiV ar [~vi] = 0. (22)
Solving this for qi yields the demands in (2). Substituting qi into the market clearing condi-
tion and solving for p proves the claim.
Corollary 1: The expressions for the comparative statics are
dp
dy
=
2x
2x + (1  )2y
> 0, (23)
dp
d2y
=
  (y (1  ) + r2x)2x 
2x + 
2
y (1  )
2 ? 0, (24)
dp
d
=
 
y   r2y
  
2x + 
2
y

2x 
2x + 
2
y (1  )
2 ? 0, and (25)
dp
d2x
=  r
 
4x + 
4
y (1  ) + 22y2x (1  )
  2yy (1  ) 
2y (1  ) + 2x
2 ? 0. (26)
Proposition 1: To prove the claim, we rst derive equations (9) and (10). Investors utility
can be expressed as ui =   exp

r
 
qTi vi + li
	
, i 2 f1; 2g where r is their level of risk
aversion, qi = (qi;k; qi;a)
T represents the 2  1 vector of investor is demand for shares in
the 2 rms, ~v1 = ~x = (~xk; ~xa)
T , and ~v2 = ~x + ~y = (~xk; ~xa + ~y)
T . Each investor maximizes
her expected terminal utility subject to the budget constraint
wi = q
T
i P + li,
where wi is the initial wealth endowment and P = (pk; pa)
T is the price vector. Note that
the price per share of the risk-free asset, like its return, has been normalized to one. Substi-
tuting the budget constraint, it is straightforward to show that maximizing expected utility is
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equivalent to maximizing the following certainty equivalent
CEi = q
T
i (E [vi] P) 
1
2
rqTi Cov [vi] qi,
where Cov [v1] = x and Cov [v1] = x + y, with
:x = Cov [(~xk; ~xa)] =
2642xk 0
0 2xa
375 and y =
2640 0
0 2y
375 .
Note that equation (27) below holds with non-zero covariance terms in x and y and
non-zero variance for rm ks CSR performance as long as the covariance matrices remain
positive-denite. The rst order condition for an investor of type i choosing share quantities
to maximize wealth is given by
E [vi] P  rCov [vi] qi = 0,
such that the optimal demand for a type-i investor is given by
qi =
1
r
Cov [vi]
 1 (E [vi] P) .
Prices are set such that aggregate demand equals aggregate supply. We assume that there
is 1 share of each rm per investor and denote 1 = (1; 1)T the supply vector in the 2-rm
case. Therefore, it has to be the case that, on average, (1  ) q1 + q2 = 1. Substituting
the optimal demands yields
1  
r
Cov [v1]
 1 (E [v1] P) + 
r
Cov [v2]
 1 (E [v2] P) = 1.
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Substituting our terms for output moments and solving for the price vector yields
P = x +
 
(1  )  1x + (x + y) 1
 1  
 (x + y)
 1 y   r1 . (27)
Equations (9) and (10) in the text follow directly from (27). First, substitute (8), (9), and
(10) into pk + pa  pu. Substituting r2y > y,  = 0,  = 1, or r2y = y proves the claim.
Proposition 2: Expected price in period 2 is dened by E [ ~m] = x and E [~n] = y as
E [p2] = x  r 1
x + m
+ 

y ( y + n)  r
 y + n + (1  ) (x + m)

.
The expected change in price is therefore:
E [p2   p1] = r m
x (m + x)
(28)
+r
n + (1  ) m
( y + (1  ) x) ( y + n + (1  ) (x + m)) (29)
+y
(1  ) (nx   m y)
( y + (1  ) x) ( y + n + (1  ) (x + m)) . (30)
Corollary 2: Substituting (17) and (18) into E [p2   p1] proves the claim.
Proposition 3: The respective derivatives are given by
d
dn
= 
(1  ) (m + x) +  y
( y + n + (1  ) (x + m))2
 0, (31)
d
d
=
n (m + n + x +  y)
( y + n + (1  ) (x + m))2
 0, (32)
d
dm
=
  (1  ) n
( y + n + (1  ) (x + m))2
 0, (33)
d
dx
=
  (1  ) n
( y + n + (1  ) (x + m))2
 0, and (34)
d
d y
=
 n
( y + n + (1  ) (x + m))2
 0. (35)
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Proposition 4: Substituting (16) and (15) into T = (1  ) jq1;2   q1;1j yields
T = (1  )
E [~vijm;n]  p2rV ar [~vijm;n]   1

= (1  ) 
0
x
r
  1 + (1  )  0x 0y

y y + nn
 0y
  r 1
 0y

=
 (1  )
1  + y+n
x+m
1  y y + nnr
 . (36)
B Non-zero correlation between x and y
This section discusses the baseline model when x and y are correlated, with Cov [~x; ~y] =
xy and  2 [ 1; 1]. While a type-1 investors certainty equivalent and, therefore, demand
is not a¤ected, a type-2 investors certainty equivalent and demand are now
CE2 = q2 (x+ y   p)  1
2
rq22
 
2x + 
2
y + 2xy

and (37)
q2 =
x+ y   p
r
 
2x + 
2
y + 2xy
 . (38)
The market-clearing condition is then given by
(1  ) x  p
r2x
+ 
x+ y   p
r
 
2x + 
2
y + 2xy
 = 1. (39)
This implies that the equilibrium price is
p = x+
2x
2x + (1  )
 
2y + 2xy
 y   r 2x  2x + 2y + 2xy
2x + (1  )
 
2y + 2xy
 (40)
= x  r2x +
2x
2x + (1  )
 
2y + 2xy
  y   r  2y + 2xy . (41)
This implies that an increase in the correlation, , decreases the extent to which y is priced.
The reason is that an increase in  increases the perceived risk of type-2 investors and, there-
fore, decreases their equilibrium holdings. The increase in perceived risk and the decrease in
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holdings have countervailing e¤ects on the risk premium. However, the rst e¤ect dominates
such that the risk premium increases when  increases,
@

r
2x(2x+2y+2xy)
2x+(1 )(2y+2xy)

@
= 2r
5xy 
2x + (1  )
 
2y + 2xy
2 > 0.
This implies that when y > 0 then dp
d
< 0.
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